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The  choice  of  Richmond  as  a  Federal  Reserve 
city  was  greeted  with  jubilation  by  the  civic  leaders 
of  the  old  capital  of  the  Confederacy.  For  three 
months  they  had  waged  a carefully  orchestrated  cam- 
paign  to  convince  the  Reserve  Bank  Organization 
Committee,  established  to select  the  sites for the  new 
Reserve  Banks,  of  the  superiority  of  Richmond’s 
claims  over  those  of  such  competing  cities  as 
Washington,  Baltimore,  Charlotte,  and  Columbia. 
The  chief  architect  of that  campaign  was  George  J. 
Seay. 
For  %ay,  the  choice  of Richmond,  announced  on 
April  2,  1914,  was a great  personal  triumph.  He  had 
worked  tirelessly  in  the  campaign  to  bring  the 
Reserve  Bank  to  Richmond.  The  city’s  petition  to 
the  organization  committee  and  its  supporting  brief 
were  largely  his  work.  He  had  made  the  principal 
oral  presentation  before  the  committee  in January 
19 14  and  had  prepared  the  revised  written  brief 
presented  to the  committee  in the  following  month. 
With  other  Richmond  leaders,  he  had  toured  the 
Carolinas  in  an  effort  to  mobilize  support  among 
bankers  and  business  leaders  in those  states.  He  had 
prepared  an  extensive  brief  countering  efforts  by 
Baltimore  leaders  to reverse  the  choice  of Richmond. 
Seay’s  contributions  were  recognized  and  lauded, 
even  among  the  leaders  of rival campaigns.  The  com- 
pelling  arguments  presented  in  his  brief  to  the 
organization  committee  were  widely  credited  as the 
crucial  factor  in  the  decision  to  locate  the  Reserve 
Bank  in  Richmond. 
George  J.  Seay  was  born  in  Petersburg,  Virginia, 
in  March  186’2.  He  was  educated  in  the  public 
schools  of Petersburg,  winning  first honors  on gradu- 
ation  from  high  school.  Seay  had  no  college  train- 
ing.  At  17,  he  accepted  employment  as a runner  at 
the  Petersburg  Savings  and  Insurance  Company.  His 
talents  were  quickly  recognized,  and  he  rose  rapidly 
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in  the  organization.  He  served  that  institution  for 
24  years,lthe  last  nine  as  cashier.  In  1902,  he  was 
elected  president  of the  Virginia Bankers  Association. 
He  resigned  from  the  Petersburg  institution  in  1903 
to become  a partner  in the  Richmond  banking  house 
of Scott  and  String-fellow.  He  remained  in that  post 
until  1909,  leaving  in that  year  to  devote  himself  to 
independent  study  of  banking  reform  arid  railroad 
finance,  subjects  that  had  commanded  his  interest 
for  most  of  his  adult  life. 
Seay  was  especially  interested  in  the  movement 
for banking  reform  at the  turn  of the  century  and had 
followed  closely  the  various  reform  proposals.  He 
published  a pamphlet  on the  Fowler  and Aldrich  bills 
and  was  said  to  have  “devoted  many  months’  study 
to the  Federal  Reserve  Act during  its progress  in Con- 
gress.”  While  the  record  indicates  that  he  retired  in 
1909,  at  the  age  of  47,  it  is  likely  that  he  main- 
tained  some  connection  with  one  or  more  local 
businesses  between  1909 and  19 13, perhaps  in a con- 
sultative  capacity.  On  December  28,  1913,  he  was 
retained  by  the  Committee  on  Locating  a Federal 
Reserve  Bank  in  Richmond  to  put  together  a case 
for  the  city’s petition  to the  organization  committee. 
Following  the  choice  of Richmond  as a site for one 
of the  Reserve  Banks,  Seay,  amid plaudits  for his con- 
tributions,  was widely  regarded  as a likely  candidate 
for  a high post  in the  new  institution.  He  was recom- 
mended  by  a  former  employer  as  a  man  “.  .  .  of 
absolute  integrity  and  high  character,  perfect  habits 
and  of great  industry  and  energy,  with  an efficiency, 
capacity  and  ability  in banking  matters  which  I have 
never  seen  surpassed,  an!  rarely  equalled  in  many 
men  of  his  age.”  This  employer  deemed  him 
“eminently  qualified”  for  the  position  of manager  of 
the  Reserve  Bank. 
The  Richmond  Reserve  Bank  was incorporated  on 
May  18,  1914.  On  the  same  day,  representatives  of 
some  2 10 banks  from  the  Fifth  District  met  in Rich- 
mond  to  discuss  procedures  for  electing  three  Class 
A  directors,  representing  the  banking  community, 
and  three  Class  B directors,  representing  industry, 
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without  authority  to  elect  directors,  but  it  never- 
theless  proceeded  to  offer  a preferred  slate  of can- 
didates  which  included  Seay’s  name  as  a  Class  B 
director.  This  slate  was  later  elected  through  the 
elaborate  election  procedure  prescribed  in the  Federal 
Reserve  Act.  While  in January  Seay  had  indicated 
to  the  organization  committee  that  he  had  “no 
business  or  financial  connection,”  in  executing  the 
oath  of  office  as  director,  in  August  he  described 
himself  as “Vice  Pres’t  U.S.  Tobacco  Co.  and  RR 
and  Financial  Statistician  and  Expert.” 
Selected  with  Seay  in the  Class  B category  were 
David  R.  Coker  of.Hartsville,  South  Carolina,  and 
James  F.  Oyster  of Washington,  D.C.  The  Class  A 
directors  were  Waldo  Newcomer  of Baltimore,  J. F. 
Bruton  of Wilson,  North  Carolina,  and  Edwin  Mann 
of Bluefield,  West  Virginia.  Three  Class  C directors, 
representing  the general  interest,  were  appointed  later 
by  the  Federal  Reserve  Board.  They  were  William 
Ingle  of Baltimore,  designated  Chairman  and  Federal 
Reserve  Agent,  James  A.  Moncure  of  Richmond, 
designated  Deputy  Chairman  and  Deputy  Federal 
Reserve  Agent,  and  M.F.H.  Gouveneur  of  Wil- 
mington,  North  Carolina.  At  its  first  meeting,  on 
October  .5,  the  board  of  directors  elected  Seay  to 
be  the  Bank’s  first  governor,  as the  chief  executive 
officer  was  then  called.  It also  named  him  the  Fifth 
District’s  representative  to  the  Federal  Advisory 
Council. 
Seay  served  as  governor  of  the  Richmond  Bank 
until  1936..His  tenure  covers  the  Federal  Reserve 
System’s  formative  years.  This  formative  period 
embraces  two  distinct  chapters,  the  first  dominated 
by  World  War  I and  the  second  by  the  vicissitudes 
of the .world  economy  in the  decade  following.  The 
second  chapter  ended  unhappily,  with the great  stock 
market  crash  of  1929  followed  by  a collapse  of the 
banking  system  that  led  to  a  restructuring  of  the 
Federal  Reserve. 
The  early  years-the  period  from  1914  to the  end 
of  1929-posed  a number  of key  issues  the  resolu- 
tion  of which  was  important  in the  development  of 
effective  monetary  policy  mechanisms  as well  as an 
efficient  payments  system.  First,  there  was the  basic 
issue  of  the  distribution  of  authority  between  the 
‘Reserve  Banks  and  the  Reserve  Board.  This  issue 
remained  in abeyance  during  the  war years  when  the 
Banks  were  preoccupied  with  war financing  and were 
largely  under  Treasury  domination.  Second,  there 
were  issues  of credit  policy  involving  the  forging  of 
effective  policy  tools  and  their  application  to  the 
problems  of the  time.  Third,  there  were  issues  and 
problems  involved  in a broad  effort  to  improve  the 
nation’s  payments  arrangements,  especially  in  the 
area of check  collection.  The  Richmond  Bank,  under 
Seay,  played  an  important  role  in  the  System’s 
efforts  to  confront  these  issues  constructively. 
Financing  World  War  I 
The  entry  of the United  States  into the  First  World 
War  in April  1917  presented  a special  challenge  to 
the  Reserve  Banks.  As  fiscal  agents  of  the  federal 
government,  they  were  called  on’  to  serve  the 
Treasury  in planning  and  implementing  a program 
to  finance  the  war  effort  with  minimal  disturbance 
to the  nation’s  financial  markets.  Seay  and  the  other 
Reserve  Bank  governors  participated  in  the  plan- 
ning  sessions. 
The  Banks’  services  to the  Treasury  in this  regard 
began  in March,  just  before  the  country’s  entry  into 
the  war.  At  that  time  the  Banks  distributed  for  the 
Treasury  $50  million  of certificates  of indebtedness 
issued  in anticipation  of income  tax  receipts  due  in 
June.  The  Richmond  Bank  was  allotted  $Z’million 
of this  issue;which  it  placed  promptly. 
Then  followed  the  first  of five multi-billion-dollar 
bond  issues  aggregating  more  than  $24  billion,  an 
unprecedented  magnitude  of  borrowing.  The  so- 
called  First  Liberty  Loan,  announced  on  May  14, 
was  a $2-billion,  30-year  issue  dated  June  15,  with 
interest  at  3%  percent.  An  elaborate  effort  was 
mounted  to market  this issue.  Secretary  McAdoo  led 
the  effort,  touring  the  country  in  what  he  later 
described  as  a “.  .  . great  movement  that  vibrated 
with  energy  and  patriotism  and  swept  the  country 
from  coast  to coast  in the  greatest  bond-selling  cam- 
paign  ever  launched  by  any  nation.” 
The  marketing  effort  centered  heavily  on  the 
Reserve  Banks.  In  accordance  with  detailed  plans 
provided  by  the  Treasury,  each  Bank  established  a 
closely  structured,  Districtwide  network  for  pro- 
moting  sales.  The  Reserve  Bank  governors  were 
designated  chairmen  of District  committees  made  up, 
in turn,  of the  chairmen  of state  committees;  who, 
in their  turn,  appointed  county  and local committees. 
In the  Richmond  District,  a Liberty  Loan  bureau  was 
set up in every  bank,  and each was advised  of its “pro- 
portionate  amount  of  the  loan,  based  on  its  total 
resources.”  An  executive  staff,  reporting  directly  to 
Governor  Seay  and  including  teams  of  field  direc- 
tors,  coordinated  the  effort.  Seay  considered  the 
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and  threw  himself  wholeheartedly  into  each 
.campaign. 
The  premise  of the  financing  program  was that  the 
war  should  be financed  to the  extent  possible  by the 
real  savings  of the  public.  Bank  credit,  and  in par- 
ticular  Reserve  Bank  credit,  was  to  be  relied  on 
only  residually  with  every  effort  made  to  hold  the 
residual  to  a minimum,  in keeping  with  the  prevail- 
ing  view  in banking  circles  that  bank  credit  should 
be  directed  primarily  at  financing  production  and 
accommodating  trade,  not  at accommodating  govern- 
ment.  Hence  a large promotional  effort  was directed 
at  placing  the  bonds  with  the  nonbank  public. 
Seay  approached  the  financing  task  with  a fervor 
bordering  on  the  religious  and  worked  untiringly  to 
match  or excel  the  best  efforts  of the  other  Reserve 
Banks.  Writing  in  1923,  he  noted  the  District’s 
“remarkable  record”  in  1917,  1918,  and  1919,  when 
the  actual  purchases  of all types  of war  securities  by 
the  people  of the  Fifth  District  reached  “the  stupen- 
dous  aggregate  of $1.1  billion!” It was his “deliberate 
and  mature  judgement  that  but  for the  existence  of 
the  Federal  Reserve  System  .  .  .  Germany  would 
have  won.”  He  also  believed  that  “the  bringing 
of the  Federal  Reserve  System  into  being  and  en- 
abling  it to perform  such  a signal  service  for civiliza- 
tion  was  nothing  less  than  an  act  of  Providence.” 
As  the  apparatus  of wartime  controls  expanded, 
the  Reserve  Banks  were  given  a variety  of additional 
duties  in the  areas  of foreign  exchange  trading,  gold 
export  controls,  and  surveillance  over  the  capital 
issues  of corporations  and  municipalities.  Much  of 
the  added  work  fell directly  on Seay,  who was already 
heavily  preoccupied  with  perfecting  the  District’s 
organization  for  handling  the  Liberty  Loans.  The 
work  burden  contributed  to a breakdown  in his health 
in  the  autumn  of  1918.  At  the  height  of  the  influ- 
enza  outbreak  of  that  year,  he  fell  dangerously  ill 
and  was  bedridden  for  more  than.a  month.  Subse- 
quently,  at the  insistence  of the  Bank’s directors,  he 
underwent  a convalescence  of several  months  before 
returning  to  work. 
For the five drives,  subscriptions  nationwide  totaled 
just over $24  billion. The  slightly more  than $1 billion 
handled  by  the  Richmond  Bank  thus  accounted  for 
roughly  4 percent  of the  total.  At  that  time,  the  na- 
tion’s  financial  wealth  was  heavily  concentrated  in 
the  large  centers  of the  Northeast.  The  New  York, 
Boston,  and  Philadelphia  Districts  accounted  for 
nearly  half the  total  subscriptions,  with  Chicago  and 
Cleveland  accounting  for  an  additional  25  percent. 
The  Richmond  District  stood  seventh  in  subscrip- 
tions,  behind  San  Francisco. 
Seay  and  the  Richmond  Bank  won  plaudits 
throughout  the  District  for  their  efforts.  The  work 
of  all  the  Banks  was  widely  appreciated  and  the 
System  emerged  from  the  war  with  great  prestige. 
It  had  won  its  spurs,  so  to  speak,  and  was  widely 
accepted  as the  institution  at the  heart  of the  nation’s 
financial  system. 
The  Reserve  Banks  and  the  Reserve  Board 
1.  The  Issue  of Authority  A  major  issue  in  the 
early  years  of  the  System  was  the  question  of  the 
division  of authority  between  the  Reserve  Banks  and 
the  Federal  Reserve  Board.  The  question  was  par- 
ticularly  contentious  until  the  banking  acts  of  the 
middle  1930s buttressed  the  authority  of the  Reserve 
Board  in  several  areas.  For  most  of  the  decade  of 
the  192Os,  however,  the  Banks  offered  a  distinct 
resistance  to the  Board’s  dictates  and  relations  were 
marked  by  a  continuing  tension. 
By  common  agreement,  the  new  System,  when 
launched,  was  .a  regional  arrangement  envisaging 
substantial  autonomy  for  the  individual  Reserve 
Banks.  But the  lines  were  not  sharply  drawn.  Broad 
supervisory  and coordinating  authority  was vested  in 
the  Reserve  Board  by the-Federal  Reserve  Act.  The 
view was widely  held,  however,  that  the  Board’s role 
should  be  constraining  and  coordinating,  not  coer- 
cive,  leaving  the  Banks  latitude  for  independent 
action  to  cope  with  credit  and  payments-system 
problems  peculiar  to their  respective  Districts.  There 
was  a general  reluctance  to  describe  the  System  as 
a “central  bank,”  as though  the  term  might  under- 
mine  the  emphasis  on  regionalism. 
The  Richmond  Bank’s  directors  sought  from  the 
beginning  to  reach  an  understanding  on  the  scope 
of their authority.  They  sent  a delegation  to the Board 
early  in  1915  to  discuss  the  matter  but  received 
little  satisfaction.  Immediately  afterward,  a  sharp 
dispute  with  the  Reserve  Board  erupted  over  the 
issue of Governor  Seay’s salary. The  Richmond  direc- 
tors  had set his annual  salary at $15,000  only to have 
the  Reserve  Board  reduce  it  to  $10,000.  There 
followed  a  sharp  exchange  of  letters  in  which  the 
Board rebuked  the  Bank’s directors  and peremptorily 
asserted  its right to approve  salaries  at all levels.  The 
directors  acquiesced,  but  the  episode  left  scars. 
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had  an  important  effect  on  the  distribution  of  au- 
thority  in  the  System.  Until  the  end  of  1919,  the 
exigencies  of Treasury  borrowing  for  the  war  effort 
subordinated  both  the  Reserve  Board  and  the 
Reserve  Banks  to  the  Treasury’s  mandate.  But  the 
practical  knowledge  and experience  that  the Treasury 
required  in its debt  management  and financing  opera- 
tions  were  heavily  concentrated  in  the  Reserve 
Banks,  especially  the  New  York  Bank.  As  a result, 
Treasury  officials  tended  increasingly  to  work 
directly  through  the  Reserve  Bank  governors  and  to 
bypass  the  Reserve  Board.  Governor  Harding  of the 
Boston  Bank,  who  had  served  earlier  as  a member 
of the  Reserve  Board,  once  remarked  that  for  this 
reason  members  of the  Reserve  Board frequently  felt 
left  out  of  important  deliberations. 
As matters  developed  in the  192Os, the  governors 
of  the  Reserve  Banks,  acting  through  conferences 
that  met  semiannually,  were  able  to  establish 
themselves  as  a  major  factor  in  shaping  System 
policies  and  practices.  At  these  conferences,  the 
governors  discussed  and  analyzed  in  detail  the  full 
range  of  problems,  confronting  the  System.  The 
discussions  were  comprehensive,  frequently  lasting 
four  days  or  more  and  including  sessions  with  the 
Reserve  Board  and with  Treasury  officials.  Standing 
committees  kept  major  issues,  including  credit  policy 
and  payments-system  problems,  under  continuing 
study. 
Compared  with  the  members  of  the  Reserve 
Board,  the  Reserve  Bank governors  were  much  closer 
to  the  day-to-day  problems  in  the  banking  system 
and  in credit  markets.  For  the  most  part,  they  were 
seasoned  bankers  with  hands-on  experience  of the 
technical  details  of  both  the  payments  system  and 
credit  operations  of commercial  banks.  This  gave  the 
Conference  of Governors  an important  advantage  in 
the  give-and-take  that  determined  the  degree  of 
autonomy  of the  Reserve  Banks.  Under  the  leader- 
ship  of Benjamin  Strong,  governor  of the  New  York 
Reserve  Bank,  the  Conference  of Governors  became 
the  dominant  forum  in the  System  in the  1920s  with 
Strong  emerging  as.the  leading  figure  in the  System. 
2.  Seayk  l4’trws  Seay  was  a major  contributor  to 
the  deliberations  of the  Conference?  He  was  chair- 
man  of the  committee  on  discount  rate  policy  and 
also  chaired  a  special  advisory  committee  to  the 
Federal  Reserve  Board  on  legislation. 
Like  most  of his colleagues,  Seay  had  an aversion 
to  the  term  “central  bank.”  He  was  a  vigorous 
defender  of regionalism  and  favored  a high  degree 
of autonomy  for  the  Reserve  Banks.  He  argued,  in 
particular,  that  the  Banks,  as the  best judges  of credit 
conditions  in  their  respective  Districts,  deserved 
broad  latitude  in  setting  discount  rates.  Because  of 
what  he  perceived  as wide  disparities  of basic  credit 
conditions  among  Districts,  he  opposed  requiring 
uniformity  of discount  rates.  He  also insisted  on the 
right  of  individual  Reserve  Banks  to  buy  and  sell 
government  securities. 
Yet  Seay  was  a team  player.  To  him,  autonomy 
defined  a relationship  between  the  Reserve  Board 
and  the  Banks  and  did  not  preclude  close  coopera- 
tion  among  the  Banks.  He  thought  that  the  gover- 
nors  of the  Banks  should  discuss  discount  rate  policy 
every  60  days  and  that  such  discussions  should 
become  an  important  factor  in  discount  rate  deci- 
sions.  He  thought  that  transactions  in  government 
securities  should  be  managed  with  similar  coopera- 
tion  among  the  Reserve  Bank  governors  and  was 
prepared  to  limit,  though  not  to  deny  altogether, 
independent  operations  by  the  Banks. 
In other  areas of the  Reserve  Banks’ activities,  Seay 
was inclined  to’favor  Systemwide  uniformity  of prac- 
tice.  This  was  especially  the  case for such  fiayments- 
system  functions  as check  collection  and clearing  and 
noncash  collections:  He  sought  uniformity  of prac- 
tice  in such  technical  details  as the  timing  of debits 
and credits  to reserve  accounts  in the course  of check- 
collection  operations,  the  treatment  in  reserve  ac- 
counting  of coin and currency  en route  to the  Reserve 
Banks  from  members,  and penalties  for reserve  defi- 
ciencies.  Questions  involving  these  and  other  impor- 
tant  details  were  not  definitively  settled  in the  192Os, 
and for much  of the  decade  practices  differed  among 
the  several  Districts. 
Yet  close  cooperation  among  the  governors  was 
the  general  rule.  The  Conference  of  Governors, 
under  the  leadership  of Governor  Strong,  was  pro- 
tective  of the  rights  of the  individual  Banks  and resis- 
tant  to  broad  interpretations  of the  Reserve  Board’s 
authority.  Strong’s  death  in  October  1928  marked 
the,beginning  of a shift of power  away from the  Banks 
and  toward  the  Reserve  Board,  away  from  region- 
alism  and  toward  centralization.  The  stock  market 
crash  of  1929  and  the  banking  collapse  of  the 
1930-33  period  accelerated  that  shift.  The  Banking 
Acts  of  1933  and  1935  ratified  it in many  respects. 
For virtually  all of the  decade  of the  192Os, however, 
the  Reserve  Banks  were  able  to  hold  centralization 
at  bay  and  to  realize  a  high  degree  of  autonomy. 
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I.  Gen~alBackgmnd  The  decade  of the  1920s 
presented  a variety  of challenges  to  the  System.  It 
was,  in general,  a period  of rapid  economic  growth, 
fueled  by  the  intensive  development  of new  indus- 
tries-the  automobile,  radio,  major  appliances-and 
by  innovations  in  the  organization  of  production. 
Public  confidence  in  the  economy’s  capacity  to 
generate  high  levels  of  prosperity  ran  high  and 
translated  soon  into  a strong  speculative  mood  that 
constituted  an  important  element  in  the  backdrop 
against which  the  Reserve  Banks operated.  Prosperity 
was  by  no  means  comprehensive,  however.  The 
agricultural  sector  remained  depressed  for the  entire 
decade.  Large  numbers  of  bank  failures  occurred 
almost  every  year.  Serious  problems  existed,  too,  in 
the  international  area.  A large  fraction  of the  world’s 
monetary  gold  had  lodged  in  this  country  and  its 
orderly  redistribution  became  a key  condition  for the 
restoration  of the  international  gold  standard,  a prime 
objective  of U.S.  policy.  The  vexatious  issue  of war 
reparations  and  resurgent  economic  nationalism  in 
the  world  at  large  were  also  complicating  factors. 
Early  in  the  decade,  the  economy  slipped  into  a 
severe  recession  for  which  the  System  was  widely 
blamed.  Milder  recessions  occurred  in  1923-24  and 
1927.  Combined  with  the  continuing  bank  failures 
and  widespread  farm  sector  discontent  with  credit 
conditions,  these  interruptions  seriously  eroded  the 
System’s  prestige,  which  reached  a low point  in the 
financial  disturbances  at the  end  of the  decade  and 
in  the  early  1930s. 
2.  Seay’s Appmach to Credit Pohy  During  the war 
years,  credit  policy  was  dominated  by  the  U.S. 
Treasury.  The  discount  rate  was  determined  by the 
interest  rate  the  Treasury  placed  on  its  offerings  of 
securities.  Moreover,  to facilitate the Treasury’s  finan- 
cings,  the  Reserve  Banks  offered  preferential  rates 
on  their  loans  when  government  securities  were 
offered  as collateral.  Such  loans  were  made  at rates 
slightly below  the  nominal  rate on the  Liberty  bonds, 
with  the  result  that  they  rose  sharply  and,  while  the 
Reserve  Banks  bought  only small amounts  of govern- 
ment  securities,  they  held  large amounts  as collateral. 
Seay  shared  a widespread  conviction  that  exten- 
sive use  of bank  credit  to finance  the  war would  pose 
a problem  in the  war’s  aftermath.  At  this  stage,  he 
adhered  strictly  to  the  commercial  loan  (or  real 
bills)  theory,  holding  that  bank  credit  should  be  ex- 
tended  to  finance  only  self-liquidating  loans  arising 
out  of the  production  or distribution  of goods.  Credit 
extended  for any  other  purpose,  including  even  the 
holding  of  government  securities,  represented  un- 
sound  banking  practice  and  multiplied  the  risk  of 
destabilizing  price  movements.  Seay would  purchase 
only  those  government  bonds  that  were  eligible  for 
use  as  collateral  for  national  bank  notes  and  this 
only  for  the  purpose  of  retiring  all  such  notes  in 
order  to leave  the  issue  function  exclusively  with  the 
Reserve  Banks. 
Like  most  of his contemporaries,  Seay had no idea 
of  using  Federal  Reserve  credit  policies  in  any 
countercyclical  way.  He  attributed  the  burst  of 
rising  prices  in  1919  and  1920  to the  large  amounts 
of government  securities  in the  banking  system.  Like 
most  of his  colleagues,  he  failed  to  envisage  using 
open  market  operations  in government  securities  as 
a policy  instrument.  Rather,  he felt that  the  inflation 
problem  had  to be met  with  discount  rate  action  that 
would  force  banks  to  disgorge  their  government 
securities.  Following  the  lead  of Strong,  he  recom-‘ 
mended  and  the  Richmond  directors  voted  succes- 
sive increases  in the  discount  rate  from  4 percent  in 
late  1919  to  6  percent  in  mid-1920. 
The  discount  rate  increases  in this  period  created 
some  friction  in relations  with  the  Treasury,  which 
operated  in the  market  for government  securities  on 
a virtually continuing  basis at the  time.  Since discount 
rate  increases  tended  to  hamper  its  operations,  the 
Treasury  favored  a  program  of  direct  controls  on 
credit  expansion  administered  by the  Reserve  Banks 
instead  of rate  increases.  This  view  also found  some 
support  at  the  Reserve  Board.  The  Reserve  Bank 
governors  for  the  most  part  felt,  as did  Strong  and 
Seay,  that  credit  expansion  could  not  be  controlled 
effectively  without  discount  rate  action. 
When  the  economy  slipped  into  a sharp  recession 
in the  spring  of 1920,  Seay  and the  Richmond  direc- 
tors  saw  little  reason  to  reduce  the  discount  rate 
promptly.  Indeed,  the  Reserve  Banks  generally  were 
slow to take  any easing  action.  In the  face of a sharp 
break  in commodities  prices,  rising  unemployment, 
and  a  severe  depression  in  the  farm  sector,  the 
System  came  under  criticism  by a number  of groups, 
especially  by  governors  and  legislators  from  farm 
states.  Under  pressure  from the Treasury,  the  Boston 
and  New  York  Banks  began  reducing  their  discount 
rates  in the  spring  of 192 1. But the  Richmond  Bank 
continued  to  hold  out,  waiting  until  November  to 
reduce  its  rate  from  6  percent  to  5%  percent  and 
until  December  to  reduce  it  to  5  percent. 
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action  of  the  System  in  the  recession  of  1920-Z 1. 
He  argued  that  the  basic  problem  was  the  earlier 
credit  inflation  caused  by sizable  holdings  of govern- 
ment  securities  in the  banking  system.  The  solution 
lay  in  moving  these  securities  out  of  the  banking 
system  and  into  the  hands  of the  nonbank  public. 
He  considered  the  resulting  reduction  in bank  credit, 
with  its  accompanying  setback  to  business,  a 
necessary  and  inevitable  part  of the  nation’s  adjust- 
ment  from  a wartime  to  a peacetime  economy. 
Seay also argued  that  an overriding  objective  of dis- 
count  rate  policy  had  to be the  protection  of the  gold 
reserves  of the  Reserve  Banks.  At  the  depth  of the 
1920-Z 1 recession,  the gold reserve  ratio of the  Rich- 
mond  Bank  had  fallen  to  34  percent  and  the  ratios 
of five other.Reserve  Banks  were  substantially  lower, 
far  below  the  legal  limit  of  40  percent.  These  low 
reserve  ratios  were  clearly  a factor  in  the  tardiness 
of the  Richmond  and  other  Reserve  Banks  in reduc- 
ing the  discount  rate.  Seay’s view,  widely  held  at the 
time,  was  that  the  System’s  main  concerns  had  to- 
be  the  soundness  of bank  credit,  the  prevention  of 
financial  panics,  and  the  preservation  of  gold 
payments.  Systematic  control  of the  money  supply 
and  positive  action  to  moderate  cyclical  swings  in 
business  were  not  part  of  his  agenda. 
3.  Changing  Views on  Operations in the Government 
Securities  Market  The  decade  was  an  extended 
learning  experience  for  the  entire  System.  Seay’s 
views  on credit  policy  underwent  significant  changes, 
as  did  those  of  most  other  System  personnel  in- 
volved  with  policy.  Credit  policy  was  discussed  at 
length  in the  semiannual  meetings  of the  Conference 
of Governors  and  in the  sessions  with  the  Reserve 
Board.  These  discussions,  and  especially  the  tren- 
chant  observations  of Governor  Strong,  had  a major 
influence  on  Seay’s  thinking.  There  were  other  in- 
fluences  as well.  One  was  an increasing  appreciation 
of the  potential  usefulness  of systematic  operations 
in the  market  for government  securities.  Another  was 
the  iarge  contemporaneous  swings  in  gold  exports 
and  imports,  which  tended  to  upset  conventional 
notions  regarding  the  relationship  between  the  gold 
reserve  ratio  and  the  discount  rate. 
In any  case,  in the  early  192Os,  Seay  modified  his 
views  on the  holding’of  government  securities  by the 
Reserve  Banks.  At a conference  of the  governors  in 
March  1923,  he  observed  that  a  stock  of  govern- 
ments  held  by Reserve  Banks  would  give the  System 
“a better  hold  upon  the  market.”  He  joined  several 
colleagues  in  noting  that  sales  from  such  holdings 
could  prove  useful  in  offsetting  excessive  easing  in 
markets  resulting  from  large  gold  imports.  This 
adjustment  in  Seay’s  attitude  was  probably  influ- 
enced  in  part  by  the  indifferent  success  of  the 
System’s  efforts  to  establish  an  acceptance  market 
of  significant  dimensions.  Seay  had  been  a  strong 
supporter  of  such  efforts  and  of  arrangements  for 
coordinating  operations  in  acceptance  markets. 
Among  the  Banks,  attitudes  toward  investing’in 
government  securities  were  affected  by a sharp  reduc- 
tion  in  their  earning  assets  .in  the  recession  of 
1920-Z 1. As rediscounts  declined  and  the  supply  of 
acceptances  diminished,  most  of the  Banks  turned 
to the government  securities  markets  for investments 
in order  to  be  able  to  cover  costs  and  pay  the  divi- 
dend  provided  for  by  the  Federal  Reserve  Act. 
Purchases  and  sales  were  of sufficient  magnitude  to 
interfere  with  Treasury  operations  in the  market  and 
hence  aroused  the  opposition  of the  Treasury.  The 
matter  was  discussed  in detail  by the  Conference  in 
May  192’2.  At  that  time,  all  the  Banks  except 
Atlanta  and  Richmond  were  buying  and  holding 
governments.  The  governors  of all, including  Rich- 
mond  and  Atlanta,  vigorously  defended  their  right 
to  do  so  at  their  discretion. 
The  Conference  was  confronted  with  the  problem 
of reconciling  the  Treasury’s  apprehensions  and  the 
Reserve  Banks’  need  for  earning  assets.  The  Banks 
were  reluctant  to  accept  any  restrictions  on  their 
right  to  invest  as  they  deemed  necessary.  The 
Treasury  for  its  part  insisted  that  the  Banks  refrain 
from  purchases  and  sales  whenever  it was  engaged 
in  market  operations. 
Under  Strong’s  leadership  and  after  extended 
discussion,  a compromise  was reached.  Each  gover- 
nor  agreed  to  recommend  to  his  directors  that  in- 
vestments  in  government  securities  be  limited  to 
“  . * . such amount  as is required,  over a period  of time, 
to  meet  . . . expenses  and  dividends  and  necessary 
reserves.”  It  was  also  agreed  that  purchases  and 
sales  would  be  coordinated  to  avoid  interference 
with  the  Treasury’s  activities  in the  market.  To  pro- 
vide  this  coordination  a.Committee  on  Centralized 
Execution  of  Purchases  and  Sales  of  Government 
Securities  by  Federal  Reserve  Banks  was  estab- 
lished,  composed  of the  governors  of the  New  York, 
Boston,  Philadelphia,  and  Chicago  Banks.  Later  the 
governor  of  the  Cleveland  Bank  was  added. 
This  committee,  under  the  chairmanship  of Gover- 
nor  Strong,  operated  until  March  1923  when,  on 
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banded  and replaced  by an Open  Market  Investment 
Committee.  The  change,  however,  made  little  dif- 
ference  in practice,  amounting  to  little  more  than  a 
formal  response  to  the  Reserve  Board’s  assertion  of 
authority  over  open  market  operations.  The  new 
committee  was  composed  of the  same  governors  as 
the  old  and  included  no  member  of  the  Reserve 
Board.  Like  its predecessor,  it allowed  the  Banks  a 
wide  latitude  of discretion  with  respect  to their  par- 
ticipation  in the new committee’s  purchases  and sales. 
Moreover,  no  limits  were  placed  on  the  Reserve 
Banks’  transactions  in  government  securities  with 
member  banks  of  their  respective  Districts. 
The  arrangements  for  dealing  in  government 
securities  were  satisfactory  to Seay and the Richmond 
directors.  The  Richmond  Bank  had  no  earnings 
problem  in that  period  and  consequently  no need  to 
rely  on  government  securities  as  a  source  of  earn- 
ings.  Accordingly,  Seay  was  not  as  exercised  over 
the  issue  as some  of his counterparts  and  could  take 
a longer-term  view  of the  implications  of the  new  ar- 
rangement.  While  he  was  fiercely  defensive  of the 
Banks’ rights  to buy and sell securities,  he agreed  with 
Strong  that  coordination  of purchases  and  sales  was 
highly  desirable.  He  argued  that  open  market  opera- 
tions  should  not  be  geared  to  the  earning  needs  of 
the  Reserve  Banks  but  rather  to  the  “overall 
credit  requirements”  of  the  economy. 
Along  with  many  of  the  other  governors,  Seay 
recognized  limitations  on the  practical  usefulness  of 
open  market  operations.  Through  much  of  the 
decade,  large  operations  had  to  be  undertaken  to 
offset  gold  movements  and  these  often  had  a major 
impact  on  the  Committee’s  portfolio  without  a cor- 
responding  effect  on bank  credit.  Moreover,  doubts 
soon  developed  that  the  government  securities 
market  was  sufficiently  large  to  accommodate  the 
magnitude  of  operations  that  domestic  and  inter- 
national  considerations  might  require.  The  Treasury 
was  actively  retiring  debt  over  much  of the  period 
and,  while  the  Committee  operated  in acceptances 
as  well,  that  market  contracted  in periods  of  slack 
business.  Recognition  of  this  limiting  factor 
strengthened  Seay’s conviction  that  the  discount  rate 
had  to  be  the  System’s  chief  policy  instrument. 
4.  Coordinating  Open  Market  and  Discount  Rate 
PohXes  The  System’s  move  toward  systematic  open 
market  operations  had  implications  for  the  manner 
in  which  discount  rate  policy  was  implemented. 
These  implications  were  quickly  recognized  by Seay 
and  others  of  the  governors.  In  1924,  Governor 
Strong  noted  that  the  “.  . . belief  of the  Governors 
‘has been  uniformly for some  years past  that the opera-’ 
tions  of the  Open  Market  Committee  are  designed 
. . . to exert  some  influence  on  matters  preliminary 
to  the  possible  need  for changes  in discount  rates.” 
In  the  same  year,  Seay  observed  that  the  Commit- 
tee’s  purchases  led  member  banks  to  reduce  their 
borrowings  at  the  discount  window  and,  with 
diminished  dependence  on  the  Reserve  Banks,  to 
step  up  their  efforts  to  make  loans.  This  put 
downward  pressure  on  loan  rates,  setting  the  stage 
for  discount  rate  reductions. 
Seay appreciated  the relationship  between  discount 
rate  policy  and  gold  movements  but  seemed  reluc- 
tant  to  use  the  discount  rate  to  help  restore  the 
international  gold  standard.  When  in  the  late 
summer  of  1927  the  Reserve  Board,  largely  at  the 
initiative  of Governor  Strong,  undertook  to  orches- 
trate  a general  reduction  in  discount  rates  in  order 
to  help  Great  Britain  solidify  its  return  to  the  gold 
standard,  the  Richmond  Bank  followed,  cutting  the 
discount  rate from 4 percent  to 3 % percent.  But Seay 
expressed  sympathy  for the  position  of the  Chicago 
Bank,  which  refused  to  reduce  its  rate,  with  the 
result  that  the  Reserve  Board  fixed  it at 3 ‘/2  percent 
at that  Bank.  This  action  by  the  Board  ran  counter 
to  Seay’s  conviction  that  the  initiative  for  rate 
changes  should  come  from  the  Banks.  But  Seay 
appears  also  to  have  entertained  doubts  about 
giving  international  considerations  precedence  over 
domestic  conditions.  When  this controversial  rate  ac- 
tion  was discussed  at the  meeting  of the  Conference 
of Governors  in November,  he  argued  that  the  rate 
should  be  higher  to  reflect  “true  market  forces  in- 
stead  of  international  conditions.” 
The  stock  market  speculation  of the  later  years  of 
the  decade  troubled  Seay.  He  met  with  groups  of 
District  bankers  on several  occasions  and urged  them 
to limit  stock  market  loans.  But to him  the  problem 
went  beyond  stock  market  loans  and  was  not  likely 
to  be  solved  by  moral  suasion.  The  basic  problem 
was excessively  easy  credit  and  had  to be  addressed 
by  effective  tightening  action  on  both  the  open 
market  and discount  rate fronts.  The  excessive  ease, 
he  argued,  resulted  largely  from  the  arbitrary 
reclassification  of demand  deposits  as time  deposits 
by  member  banks,  which  created  large  amounts  of 
excess  reserves. 
In March  1928  and  again  in April,  the  Richmond 
directors  conveyed  to the  Open  Market  Committee 
their  conviction  that  the  Committee  should  be  sell- 
ing  securities.  In  an  April  1929  communication  to 
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tional  standpoint,  a strong  reason  existed  for raising 
the  discount  rate  to 6 percent,  noting,  however,  that 
Fifth  District  conditions  could  not  justify  such  an 
action.  Rather,  they  believed  that  the  rate  should  be 
raised  first  in the  New  York  District  since  the  stock 
exchange  loan problem  was  centered  there,  with  the 
other  Banks  following  later.  Actually,  the  rate  at the 
Richmond  Bank,  which  had been  raised  in successive 
steps  from  3 ?4 to  5 percent  in  1928,  was  not  raised 
further  in  1929. 
Payments  System  Issues 
Seay  held  strong  convictions  regarding  the  role  of 
the  Reserve  Banks  in the  nation’s  payments  system. 
In his  view,  the  Reserve  Banks  should  have  the  ex- 
clusive  issue  ,privilege  and  ‘also  be  the  principal 
managers  of the  nation’s  facilities for check-collectioe 
and  check-clearing  operations. 
2.  7Xe Currency  Regarding  the  currency,  Seay 
considered  the  Federal  Reserve  note,  anchored  to 
gold  to ensure  its soundness  and to eligible  commer- 
cial  paper  to  ensure  its  “elasticity,”  the  ideal  cur- 
rency.  He  urged  that  it be allowed to displace  all other 
forms  of currency,  including  legal  tender  notes  and 
silver  certificates.  These  last  two  forms  he  believed 
to  have  taken  on  the  character  of “reserve  money,” 
and,  along  with  gold  and  gold  certificates,  should  be 
impounded  in the  Reserve  Banks  to support  Federal 
Reserve  credit  as  represented’  in  Federal  Reserve 
notes  and member  bank  reserves.  He  was unalterably 
opposed  to  the  issue  of  national  bank  notes  and 
urged  that  they  be  completely  eliminated  from  the 
circulation,  by  legislation  if necessary.  This  stance 
reflected  his  continuing  Aversion  to  linking  the’cur- 
rency  to  government  securities.  On  the  same 
grounds,  he  opposed  the  issue  of  Federal  Reserve 
Bank  notes,  which,  unlike  Federal  Reserve  notes, 
were  backed  only  by  government  securities. 
With  such  views,  Seay  often  found  himself  at odds 
with  both  the  Reserve  Board  and  the  Treasury.  He 
was  critical  of a Reserve  Board  ruling  requiring  the 
Reserve  Banks  to pay out currency  in a priority  order- 
ing with  national  bank  notes  first,  followed  in order 
by  Federal  Reserve  Bank  notes,  silver  certificates, 
legal  tender  notes,  Federal  Reserve  notes,  gold  cer- 
tificates,  and gold.  He  argued  that,  pending  the  retire- 
ment  of  national  bank  notes  and  Federal  Reserve 
Bank  notes,  Federal  Reserve  notes  should  be  third 
in  the  priority  ordering. 
Seay  also opposed  proposals  by the  Treasury  and 
the  New  York  Reserve  Bank  to  encourage  the  cir- 
culation  of gold  certificates  in periods  of heavy  gold 
imports.  He  was  also  cool  to a Treasury  request  for 
Reserve  Bank  cooperation  in an effort  to encourage 
temporary  use  by the  public  of silver  dollars  to allow 
the  buildup  of  an  inventory  of  one-dollar  bills  in 
the  months  before  the  introduction  of  a newly  de- 
signed,  smaller-sized  currency  in  the  summer  of 
1929. 
2.  The  Collection Function  Seay’s  concern  over 
the  quality  of the  currency  was  part  of a more  gen- 
eral interest  in improving  the  efficiency  of the  coun- 
try’s  payments  system,  which  he  considered  to  be 
a major  objective  of the  Federal  Reserve  Act.  The 
introduction  of  the  Federal  Reserve’s  leased  wire 
system  in  1918  was  a welcome  innovation  to  Seay, 
and  he  favored  Reserve  Bank  absorption  of the  cost 
of wire  transfers  of  funds  by  member  banks. 
The  major  effort  to improve  the  payments  system 
in the  1920s  centered  on check-collection  operations. 
Few  System  activities  in  the  1920s  commanded 
as  much  attention.  One  of  the  first  standing  com- 
mittees  of  the  Conference  of  Governors  was  the 
Standing  Committee  on  Collections  and  Clearings. 
John  S. Walden,  Jr.,  an assistant  to Seay  and  a senior 
operating  officer  of the  Richmond  Bank,  served  on 
this  committee  during  the  entire  decade.  Through 
Walden,  Seay  contributed  to  the  standing  commit- 
tee’s work.  He  was especially  interested  in promoting 
uniformity  of  procedures  and  practices  among  the 
Banks  and  in  pressing  for  effective  measures  to 
ensure  collection  at  par,  that  is,  with  no  levy  of 
exchange  charges  by  drawee  banks. 
The  committee  devised  in this  period  the  system 
of  symbols,  printed  in the  upper  right-hand  corner 
of  checks,  identifying  the  dratiee  bank  and  the 
Federal  Reserve  office  through  which  the  check 
would  be  collected.  This  system  quickly  became  of 
inestimable  value  to  banks  in  sorting  and  routing 
checks.  The  committee  also  faced  the  daunting 
task  of  working  out  a  satisfactory  arrangement  for 
timing  debits  and  credits  to  the  reserve  accounts.  of 
drawee  banks  and  depositing  banks  and  dealing  with 
the  effect  on member  bank  reserves  of arrangements 
that  involved  other  than  simultaneous  debits  and 
credits.  Only  after  long  experimentation  was  .a 
satisfactory  time  schedule  with  a system  of deferred 
credits  put  in  place. 
In  the  war  period,  as  part  of the  Board’s  general 
promotion  of  membership,  the  Banks  began  collect- 
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drafts,  and  acceptances.  Member  banks  were  quick 
to avail themselves  of this noncash-collection  service, 
which  soon  became  a major  activity  at all the  Reserve 
Banks.  When  many  of the  Reserve  Banks  were  ex- 
periencing  earnings  problems  in  the  early  192Os, 
sentiment  for  eliminating  the  service  began  to 
develop.  Such  sentiment  was especially  strong’in  the 
geographically  large  Districts  of the  South  and  the 
West-Atlanta,  Dallas,  Minneapolis,  Kansas  City, 
and  San Francisco-where  distances  were  great  and 
transportation  and  communications  costs  relatively 
high. 
Seay,  however,  insisted  on uniformity.  He  had had 
misgivings  about  offering the  service,  but  once  it was 
instituted,  he favored  continuing  it. The  System  had 
much  to  lose,  he  thought,  if it  were  perceived  as 
arbitrarily  turning  its services  off and  on in response 
to  earnings  changes.  Moreover,  noncash-collection 
services  were  consistent  with  Seay’s expansive  views 
of  the  services  the  Reserve  Banks  should  offer  to 
members.  Citing  the  nonpayment  of  interest  on 
reserve  balances,  he  argued  that  Reserve  Banks 
should  offer  to  member  banks  all the  services  they 
could  expect  from  city  correspondents. 
3.  Pmblem Areas:  Par  Colhction, Bank Faihm,  and 
Mernberxhip  Efforts  to  improve  the  collection  pro- 
cess  were  hampered  in  the  period  by  a continuing 
wave  of  bank  failures  and  by  a  running  and  often 
acrimonious  disagreement  with  state-chartered  banks 
over  exchange  charges.  In the  ensuing  controversy, 
the  System  found  itself  confronting  the  hostility  of 
state  legislatures  and  banking  commissions  as well 
as of many  state-chartered  banks.  The  Reserve  Banks 
sometimes  found  to their  consternation  that  member 
banks,  especially  the  large-city  correspondents,  gave 
them  little or no support  in this impasse.  In any case, 
the  large  number  of bank  failures,  among  members 
as well as nonmembers,  in combination  with  the par- 
collection  controversy,  tended  to  diminish  public 
confidence  in  the  System  and  to  contribute  to  a 
steady  erosion  of  membership  in  the  period. 
From  the  outset,  exchange  charges  on checks  were 
recognized  as a major  obstacle  to membership  in the 
System  by  small,  state-chartered  institutions.  The 
Reserve  Board  took  advantage  of  the  patriotism 
generated  during  the war period  to mount  a campaign 
to encourage  universal  par remittance  on a voluntary 
basis.  So-called  par  lists  were  established,  and  the 
Reserve  Banks  succeeded  in placing  on  these  lists 
the  great  majority  of the  nation’s  banks.  Yet substan- 
tial groups  of state  banks  in rural  areas  of the  South, 
West,  and Midwest  stubbornly  resisted.  Many  soon 
found  that  they  could  take  advantage  of the  System’s 
collection  facilities  through  city  correspondents 
without  becoming  members  and giving  up exchange 
charges. 
Acting  on a Reserve  Board  interpretation  that  the 
Federal  Reserve  Act  gave  the  System  authority  to 
collect  all checks  at par,  the  Reserve  Banks  met  this 
resistance  with  a  concerted  effort  to  present  the 
checks  of nonpar  banks  at the  counter  for cash  pay- 
ment.  This  action  by  the  Reserve  Banks  brought 
the  issue  to  a  head.  It  touched  off  extended  liti- 
gation  that  seriously  embittered  relations  with  small, 
state-chartered  banks  over  much  of  the  nation. 
The  Reserve  Banks  most  immediately  involved  in 
the  litigation  were  Richmond,  Atlanta,  Cleveland, 
Minneapolis,  and  San  Francisco. 
In its annual  report  for  1920,  the  Richmond  Bank 
noted  “.  .  . marked  progress  toward  the  establish- 
ment  of universal  par  collection.”  All District  states 
except  South  Carolina  were  reported  on a par basis. 
Of 2,210  banks  in the  District,  only 334,  all in South 
Carolina,  refused  to  remit  at  par.  In  view  of 
developments  in the  following year,  this report  prob- 
ably gave  an inaccurate  evaluation  of progress  toward 
universal  voluntary  par  remittance.  Data  for  subse- 
quent  years  suggest  strongly  that  the par list for 1920 
included  many  involuntary  par  remitters  at  whose 
counters  the  Richmond  Bank was presenting  checks 
for  cash  payment. 
On  February  5,  1921,  the  North  Carolina  legis- 
lature  passed  “An  Act  to  Promote  the  Solvency  of 
State  Banks,”  in which  it affirmed  the  right  of state 
banks  to charge  exchange  when  remitting  for checks 
sent  to  them  by  mail.  It  provided,  moreover,  that 
state  banks  were  not  required  to  pay  in  cash  for 
checks  presented  at  their  counters  by  the  Reserve 
Bank  or any of its agencies  but  could  pay with  a draft 
drawn  on  a correspondent  unless  the  drawer  of the 
check  had  made  a notation  to the  contrary.  Finally, 
it forbade  notaries  public  to protest  checks  when  pay- 
ment  had  been  refused  solely  because  it  had  been 
demanded  in  cash. 
The  Richmond  Bank  deemed  the  act  to  be  un- 
constitutional  and  continued  to  present  checks  on 
nonpar  banks  at the  counter  for  cash  payment.  On 
February  9,  13  nonmember  banks  brought  suit 
against  the  Richmond  Bank  in  the  Superior  Court 
of  Union  County,  North  Carolina,  and  obtained  a 
restraining  order  forbidding  the  return  as dishonored 
of checks  that  the  plaintiff  banks  had  refused  to pay 
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and  230  were  on  the  injunction  list  by  December. 
The  Richmond  Bank  refused  to  handle  the  checks 
of these  banks  and from  time  to time  published  their 
names  along  with  the  names  of  other  banks  the 
checks  of which,  for  various  reasons,  it  would  not 
handle.  At  the  end  of  192 1,  of 2,195  banks  in the 
District,  580  refused  to remit  at par.  All these  were 
in North  Carolina  (254)  and  South  Carolina  (326). 
At  trial,  the  Superior  Court  ruled  the  North 
Carolina  act  constitutional.  The  Richmond  Bank 
appealed  the  decision  to the  North  Carolina  Supreme 
Court,  which  reversed  the  Superior  Court.  The  plain- 
tiff  banks,  however,  took  the  case  to  the  U.S. 
Supreme  Court,  which  in June  1923  reversed  the 
North  Carolina  Supreme  Court  and ruled  the act con- 
stitutional.  The  banks  of the  state  thus  retained  the 
right  to charge  exchange  and to refuse  cash  payment 
for  checks  presented  by  the  Reserve  Bank  at  the 
counter. 
Paralleling  this  case  against  the  Richmond  Bank 
were  significant  cases  against  the  San  Francisco, 
Atlanta,  Cleveland,  and  Minneapolis  Banks.  As  a 
result  of  the  decisions  in  the  several  cases,  the 
System  ,ended  up  well  short  of  its  desired  goal  of 
universal  par  collection..  At  the  direction  of  the 
Reserve  Board,  the  practice  of presenting  checks  for 
cash  payment  at the  counters  of nonpar  banks  was 
discontinued.  The  System  adopted  a policy  of refus- 
ing  to handle  checks  on  nonpar  banks.  In the  years 
that  followed,  the  number  of banks  on  the  par  list 
fell  sharply. 
In the  Richmond  District,  the  U.S.  Supreme  Court 
decision  in  1923  was  quickly  followed  by  a  large 
reduction  in  the  number  of  banks  on  the  par  list. 
Three  banks  in  West  Virginia  and,  57  in  Virginia 
promptly  removed  themselves  from  the  list. The  list 
fell rapidly  over  the  remaining  years  of the  decade, 
from  1,494  in  1923  to  1,091  in  1929.  The  decline 
was  slightly  more  rapid  than  the  drop  in  the  total 
number  of banks.  At the  end  of  1929,  nearly  a third 
of the  banks  in the  District  were  not  remitting  at par. 
These  were  concentrated  heavily  in the  Carolinas  and 
Virginia.  In  North  Carolina,  some  70  percent  (294 
of 4 19) of all banks  were  nonpar;  in South  Carolina, 
almost  half  (67  of  139);  and  in  Virginia,  nearly  a 
quarter  (104  of 468).  There  were  nine  nonpar  banks 
in West  Virginia  but  none  in Maryland  or the  District 
of  Columbia. 
While  the  nonpar  banks  were  mostly  small  banks 
in  rural  areas,  the  volume  of  check  operations  for 
the  group  was  significant.  Their  refusal  to  remit  at 
par  left  an  important  gap  in  the  Federal-Reserve- 
based  payments  arrangement  that  the  System  was 
so  eager  to  establish.  The  outcome  was  especially 
disappointing  to  Seay. 
The  par-collection  issue  affected  membership.  In 
the  Fifth  District  membership  reached  a peak  of 634 
in  1922  and  then  declined  in  each  remaining  year 
of the  decade.  At  the  end  of  1929  it  totaled  525. 
The  number  of  state  members  fell  from  68  to  45. 
Over  the  same  span,  the  number  of national  banks 
declined  from  566  to  480. 
The  total  number  of banks  in the  District  fell from 
2,210  in  1920  to  1,637  at the  end  of  1929,  a reduc- 
tion  of 573.  Much  of this  decline  was  accounted  for 
by  failures,  which  totaled  431  for  the  period.  The 
failures were  heavily concentrated  in the farming  areas 
of the  District,  with  South  Carolina  accounting  for 
225,  North  Carolina  for  119,  Virginia  for  45,  and 
West  Virginia  for 34.  There  were  only  eight  failures 
in Maryland  and  none  in the  District  of Columbia. 
Among  the  failures  were  many‘national  banks  and 
state  member  banks,  which  accounted  for  much  of 
the  decline  in membership.  A handful  of state  mem- 
bers  merged  with  national  banks  during  the  period, 
but  the  decline  in state  membership  was  due  almost 
entirely  to  liquidations  and  voluntary  withdrawals. 
Concluding  Observations 
In their  first five years,  the  Federal  Reserve  Banks 
were  immersed  in problems  associated  with  financ- 
ing  the  First  World  War.  Not  until  1920  were  they 
able  to  come  to  grips  with  issues  they  were  de- 
signed  to  resolve.  To  a  significant  extent  the  ex- 
perience  of  the  1920s  represented  efforts  by  the 
Banks  and the  Reserve  Board  to fill gaps  and resolve 
ambiguities  in the  Federal  Reserve  Act,  which  was 
amended  ten  times  in  the  1920s.  The  original  act 
described  only  a  skeletal  outline  of  a  system  of 
banking  control.  Many  crucial questions  of detail were 
left unaddressed.  It remained  for the  Reserve  Board 
and  the  Banks,  in  the  course  of  practice  and  ex- 
perience,  to  put  flesh  on  the  skeleton. 
For  the  entire  decade,  the  division  of  authority 
between  the  Reserve  Board  and  the  Banks  re- 
mained  at issue.  While  the  act clearly  gave  the  Board 
broad  authority,  certain  sections  implied  substantial 
autonomy  for the  Banks.  The  new  system  had  been 
treated  all along  as  a regional  system,  not  a central 
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authority  over  the  Banks  would  be  limited  to  a 
monitoring  and  coordinating  function.  This  divas 
clearly  the  view  of  Seay.  It  was  frequently  ex- 
pressed  by  the  governors  of  the  other  Banks  and 
seems  to have  been  acquiesced  in by  some  Reserve 
Board  members  as well.  In any  case,  it is clear  from 
the  history  of the  period  that  the  governors  of the 
Banks,  as a group  under  the  leadership  of Benjamin 
Strong,  were  able  to  maintain  a  high  degree  of 
autonomy  and  to  play  a  major  role  in  shaping  the 
System’s  early  development. 
As  noted,  Seay  and  the  Richmond  Bank  were 
vigorous  defenders  of the  autonomy  of the  Reserve 
Banks.  They  were  also  major  contributors  to  the 
efforts  of  the  governors  to  develop  an  effective 
mechanism  of  credit  control  and  an  efficient 
payments  system.  In  the  credit-policy  area,  Seay 
favored  cooperative  action  by the  Banks’ governors, 
coordinated  through  the  Conference  of Governors, 
over  Reserve  Board  leadership.  He  was  a firm  sup- 
porter  of  Governor  Strong’s  efforts  to  forge  an 
effective  policy  tool  out  of the  Banks’ purchases  and 
sales  in  the  market  for  government  securities.  In 
addition,  he  chaired  the  Conference  of Governors’ 
committee  to  establish  basic  principles  that  should 
be  followed  in  setting  discount  rates. 
In the  payments-system  area,  the  Richmond  Bank 
was  in  the  forefront  of  the  effort  to  universalize 
collection  of checks  at par.  Seay  and  Walden  were 
major  contributors  to the  work  of the  Conference  of 
Governors’  Standing  Committee  on Collections  and 
Clearings.  The  Richmond  Bank  was  also  involved 
in  one  of  the  key  court  cases  that  questioned  the 
authority  of the  System  to require  par remittance  for 
checks. 
The  stock  market  crash  at the  end  of the  decade 
of  the  1920s  signaled  the  end  of  an  important 
chapter  in the  history  of the  Federal  Reserve  Banks. 
It  ushered  in  a new  set  of problems  for  the  entire 
System,  problems  that  dwarfed  in  both  magnitude 
and  complexity  any  that  had  been  confronted  up  to 
that  time.  The  banking  collapse  in  the  three  years 
that  followed  and  the  onset  of the  Great  Depression 
led to a drastic restructuring  of the System.  The  result 
was  a less  ambiguous  centralization  of authority  in 
a  newly  constituted  Reserve  Board,  renamed  the 
Board  of Governors  of the  Federal  Reserve  System, 
and  a substantial  reduction  in the  autonomy  of the 
Reserve  Banks. 
Epilogue 
The  major  reforms  of the  mid-1930s,  along  with 
important  amendments  enacted  since that  time,  have 
produced  a system  fundamentally  different,  both  in 
structure  and in approaches  to money  and credit  con- 
trol,  from  the  original.  In every  respect,  the  Federal 
Reserve  System  has  become  undeniably  a  central 
bank  or,  more  precisely,  a central  banking  system. 
The  System  today  retains,  however,  sufficient 
vestiges  of  its  pristine  form  to  continue  to  be  de- 
scribed  as unique  among  the  world’s  central  banks. 
In particular,  in the  face  of increased  centralization 
of power  in  the  hands  of the  Board  of  Governors, 
the  regional  Reserve  Banks  continue  to play  an im- 
portant  role.  Their  operations  are  crucial  to  the 
maintenance  of an efficient  payments  system.  Their 
information  services  constitute  useful inputs  into deci- 
sions  of businesses,  large  and  small,  and  of govern- 
ments.  Their  role in monetary  policymaking  has been 
restructured  to  bring  it into  closer  conformity  with 
radically  revised  views  regarding  techniques  of 
monetary  and  credit  control,  but  it is no less  signifi- 
cant.  The  boards  of directors  of the  Reserve  Banks 
continue  to  take  the  initiative  in  setting  the  dis- 
count  rate.  More  important,  the  executive  heads 
of the  Reserve  Banks,  now  styled  presidents  instead 
of  governors,  serve  actively  on  the  Federal  Open 
Market  Committee,  the  System’s  chief  policy- 
making  body. 
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